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Abstract We explore the implications of monetary unification for real interest rates and
(relative) public debt levels. The adoption of a common monetary policy renders the risk-
return characteristics of the participating countries’ public debt more similar. The implied
reduction in the scope for risk diversification raises the average expected real return on the
debt. Also, the share of the union-wide debt issued by relatively myopic governments or of
countries that initially have a relatively dependent central bank increases after unification.
This may put the political sustainability of the union under pressure. A transfer scheme that
penalizes debt increases beyond the union average is able to undo the interest rate effect of
unification, but magnifies the spread in relative debt levels.
Keywords Monetary union · (Relative) Public debt · Interest rates · Externalities ·
Substitutability · Central bank independence
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1 Introduction
The implications of European Monetary Union (EMU) for public debt and, in particular,
the real returns on public debt, have so far received only rather limited attention.1 Many
1Van Aarle et al. (1997), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) and Illing (1999) study the implications of mon-
etary unification for public debt, while Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000, 2002)
investigate public debt in a monetary union when fiscal rules are present. Missale (1999) provides an exten-
sive discussion of public debt policies in Europe before EMU. Canzoneri and Diba (1991) and Restoy (1996)
analyze real interest rates in a monetary union, while Chang (1990) explores the international externalities of
national fiscal policies for the real interest rate. De Grauwe and Polan (2001) provide an informal discussion
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economists believe that, even if there are any such implications, these are mainly the concern
of individual EMU participants, because the spillover effects of any policy changes induced
by EMU are uncertain and small (e.g., Buiter et al. 1993). In particular, as many would
argue, to the extent that an individual increase in public debt leads to higher debt-servicing
costs, these additional costs are borne only by the country under consideration in the form
of a higher risk premium in the debt return.
In this paper we demonstrate that this view may not be correct. For this purpose, we
build a simple theoretical model that can be used to analyze the implications of monetary
unification for public debt and its costs. The model is purposefully kept as simple as possible,
but has one major novel feature: as we want to analyze the effect of monetary unification on
the supply of the public debt, we do not only model the demand side of the bond market (as
is the case in most of the literature), but also its supply side. Monetary unification increases
the correlation of the real returns on the public debt of the member countries by reducing
idiosyncratic shocks to national inflation rates.2 The enhanced substitutability of the various
member countries’ public debt in the portfolios of the investors reduces the attractiveness
to the latter of holding this debt. As a result, the expected real interest rate paid on the debt
exceeds its pre-unification level. Such a potential increase in debt-servicing costs has also
been recognized by the European Commission (2002, p. 156).
Because of indirect effects running via the consumption pattern, the general equilibrium
implications for the debt level are ambiguous. However, we find that the share of the union
area’s debt issued by countries with relatively undisciplined governments or relatively de-
pendent central banks before unification increases after unification. We believe that this is
an important implication of the model, because relative debt levels seem politically more
relevant than absolute debt levels, as it is hard for a government to blame other governments
for their fiscal laxity when its own debt is high. Because relative debt levels determine the
relative importance of the interest rate externalities that countries exert on each other, they
may become a source of tension in a monetary union. Indeed, in our model, a debt increase
in one country exerts a direct positive effect on the required rate of return on other countries’
debt when these countries all form a monetary union, while this effect is absent when the
countries do not form a union. Hence, monetary unification may cause worries in low-debt
countries about the fiscal discipline of highly-indebted countries. This may put pressure on
the political sustainability of the monetary union. A fiscal transfer scheme conditional on
public debt forces individual governments to internalize the interest rate externalities of their
own debt policies. We show that such a scheme restores the before-unification average real
borrowing cost. However, the scheme magnifies the spread in relative debt levels.
We emphasize that our analysis is positive and designed to highlight the mechanisms
that may lead to the results described above. Hence, we refrain from analyzing the welfare
consequences of monetary unification or of adopting a fiscal transfer scheme. That would
require a more complicated modelling setup, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. This
section also derives the outcomes of the model under national monetary policymaking and
a monetary union. Section 3 discusses the main results. Section 4 explores a simple transfer
of a.o. the implications of EMU for interest rate spillovers. Finally, for empirical work on the relation between
public debt and real interest rates, see e.g. Ford and Laxton (1999).
2Evidence of reductions in yield spreads and increased bond return correlations in Europe after monetary
unification can be found in Capiello et al. (2003), Baele et al. (2004) and Pagano and von Thadden (2004).
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scheme that induces governments to internalize the interest rate externalities caused by their
debt policies. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the political insti-
tutions and processes underlying the government myopia that drives the debt and interest
effects of monetary unification that, in turn, may help to determine the desire of re-election
minded politicians to join a monetary union. In this section we also discuss other extensions
of the present analysis.
2 The model
2.1 Set-up
We consider a world with N > 1 countries. The countries 1, . . . ,Nu, with 2 ≤ Nu ≤ N ,
may form a monetary union, and we will compare the situation before and after monetary
unification. The monetary union and its size are exogenous. In other words, we do not study
the incentives for countries to participate in a monetary union.3 This enables us to focus on
the issues at hand, namely the implications of monetary unification for public borrowing
costs and relative debt levels. Moreover, in reality, monetary unification is often as much a
political project as it is a project based on purely economic arguments. It is often argued that
this is also the case for EMU.
The demographic structure consists of overlapping generations of a constant size. The
countries are of equal size, with the size of a generation in a country normalized to 1. Each
generation lives for two periods and is represented by a representative agent per country.
We adopt this simple overlapping generations structure, because it allows for a straightfor-
ward derivation of a simple demand function for public debt by private agents, thereby also
allowing for explicit solutions of the model (see below).
In the sequel of this subsection, we describe the behavior of the representative agents,
the governments and the central banks in the different countries. In the next subsection, we
will solve the model and consider separately the case before and after monetary unification.
2.1.1 The representative agents
Consider the representative agent born in country i in period t . In the first period of her
life, she receives an exogenous endowment Y , pays taxes Ti,t , consumes part of her after-
tax endowment, and saves the remainder for the second period of her life. In the second
period of her life, she is retired and consumes her gross savings. The agent can save by
holding public debt of each of the N countries, or by investing in a production technology
that yields an exogenously determined risk-free real rate of return r∗ ≥ 0.4 Therefore, her
3The factors that determine the desirability of monetary unification were first explored by Mundell (1961).
He emphasizes the role of transactions costs and labor mobility. Recent work has investigated the issue from a
variety of other perspectives. For example, Neumeyer (1998) finds that the welfare effects of a monetary union
depend on the trade-off between eliminating exchange rate fluctuations unrelated to economic shocks and
reducing hedging possibilities (by reducing the number of currencies); Calmfors (2001) shows that unification
alters the incentives for structural (labor market) reform; Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) demonstrate that
unification may change the strategic interactions among the fiscal and monetary policymakers in a beneficial
way; and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) study the consequences of a monetary union for trade union behavior.
4Thus, an agent born in period t foregoes consumption in that period by investing in this technology. However,
for each unit invested in period t , she receives with certainty 1 + r∗ units back for consumption in period
t + 1.
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budget constraint is given by
Ci2,t+1 =
(















where Ci1,t and Ci2,t+1 are her consumption in periods t and t + 1, respectively, while ωij,t
is the share of her savings in period t invested in public debt of country j (such that
1 − ∑Nj=1 ωij,t is the share of her savings invested in the risk-free technology) and rj,t+1
is the (ex-post) real interest rate paid in period t + 1 on the debt issued in period t . Below
we derive the shares ωij,t endogenously from the agent’s optimization problem.
Subject to (1), the representative agent maximizes her expected lifetime utility:

















, with γ > 0, (2)
where ρ is the agent’s discount rate and Et [·] is the expectations operator conditional on the
available information in period t (see below). In what follows, we will assume for simplicity
that the risk-free interest rate r∗ is equal to the discount rate ρ. We also assume that γ is
such that the marginal utility of consumption is always positive in the situations that are
relevant for the ensuing analysis.
2.1.2 The governments
Each country i has a government, called “government i.” The focus of the model is on the
government’s supply of public debt. Hence, the only role of government i in each period t is
to decide how to finance an exogenous amount of spending Gi,t (which does not affect pri-
vate agents’ utility or production possibilities),5 by raising Ti,t and issuing public debt Bi,t .
Taxes Ti,t are lump-sum and have to be paid by the young generation in period t . Public
debt has a maturity of one period, and therefore has to be paid back by the government (with
interest) in period t + 1. Hence, its dynamic budget constraint for period t can be written as:
Bi,t = Gi,t + Bi,t−1(1 + ri,t ) − Ti,t (3)
where Bi,t−1 is the debt carried over from period t − 1, which has to be paid off in period t .
Public debt is issued at a nominal interest rate, such that the ex-post real interest rate ri,t
equals this nominal interest rate minus the realized inflation rate.
Subject to (3), the government has to make a trade-off in period t between higher taxes or
issuing more public debt. On the one hand, higher taxes in period t lower the lifetime utility
of the generation that has to pay the taxes in that period. On the other hand, higher public
debt leads to higher taxes in the future, and lowers the lifetime utility of the generations
that have to pay taxes then. The resulting trade-off between the interests of the various




i,t = Ti,t +
1
1 + βi Et [Bi,t (1 + ri,t+1)], with βi > 0. (4)
5Because government spending is exogenous we could have included it as a separate component in the indi-
viduals’ utility without any consequences for the outcomes.
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While this loss function is not microfounded, the trade-off that it embodies is an important
aspect of the policy decisions made in reality.6 Parameter βi captures the relative impor-
tance that government i attaches to the interests of the current tax payers. Hence, we refer
to this parameter as the degree of myopia of this government. Government myopia may dif-
fer across countries. In reality, such differences will be related to political factors, such as
political polarization and the government turnover rate.7 The expected future debt burden
also includes the real interest that government i has to pay at that time. As public debt is
issued at a nominal interest rate, uncertainty about the inflation rate in country i between
periods t and t + 1 causes uncertainty about the ex-post real interest rate ri,t+1 (see below).
As a result, when viewed from period t , the real value of the debt burden in period t + 1 is
uncertain.
2.1.3 The central banks
Before monetary unification takes place, each country i has its own central bank. In pe-
riod t , the central bank determines the growth rate of the money supply from period t to
period t + 1, which we denote by mi,t+1. Money is held by the representative individual in
order to make transactions. In reality, for modern economies such as those of the Euro-area,
seigniorage as a fraction of GDP is very small. In order to focus our attention on the issues as
stake, we ignore seigniorage. Alternatively, we could assume that the central bank hands the
seigniorage directly back to private agents, in which case all budget constraints are unaltered
and the model solution is exactly as described below.
The growth rate of the money supply determines the inflation rate, but the link between
money growth and inflation is stochastic and given by
πi,t+1 = mi,t+1(1 + εi,t+1) (5)
where πi,t+1 is the inflation rate in country i between periods t and t + 1, and εi,t+1 is a
stochastic shock with mean zero, variance σ 2 and which is i.i.d. over time (at all lags) and
across countries. There are many reasons why a central bank has imperfect control over the
inflation rate. For instance, there may be velocity shocks or the link between the base money
supply and higher aggregation levels of the money supply (which are more closely linked to
inflation) may be affected by unforeseen events in the commercial banking sector.
Because debt is issued at a nominal interest rate, using a standard linearization, the ex-
post real interest rate on the debt is given by
ri,t+1  rei,t+1 + πei,t+1 − πi,t+1. (6)
Here, and in the sequel, we use a superscript “e” as short-hand notation for Et [·]. Further,
rei,t+1 + πei,t+1 is the nominal interest rate, which contains a component to compensate in-
vestors for the expected inflation incurred over the lifetime of the debt. We assume that
6In principle, we could set up a welfare function with each generation’s utility as input. The relative weights
attached to each generation’s utility determine the government’s degree of patience. However, to obtain sim-
ple, intuitive solutions, we propose an ad-hoc specification that captures in a simple way the trade-off that the
government faces between raising taxes and issuing public debt.
7One would expect governments to discount the future at a higher rate when preferences of political parties
differ more or when the government has a higher chance of losing office. In both cases, there is a stronger
incentive to spend more now, because any remaining resources might be spent by another government with
potentially different preferences. Cukierman et al. (1992) in their model derive the government’s “effective”
discount rate as an explicit function of the political factors mentioned here.
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international trade takes place without any barriers and that each individual, wherever she
resides, consumes the same good or bundle of goods. The nominal exchange rate will then
adjust perfectly and instantaneously to compensate for differences in inflation rates, thereby
preventing arbitrage in goods trade. In particular, the nominal exchange rate moves to offset
unexpected movements in relative inflation rates caused by the ε-shocks. As a result, the
real return on a given country’s debt is the same for any investor, no matter in which country
she is residing.
While the inflation expectation πei,t+1 is on average the correct prediction for the infla-
tion rate, actual inflation generally differs from its expectation because of its stochastic link
with the money growth rate. In this model, inflation uncertainty is the only source of un-
certainty in the returns on public debt. In reality, uncertainty in public debt returns can be
caused by other factors as well, such as occasional default or fluctuations in (the perception
of) default risk.8 We abstract from these other sources of randomness in the debt returns,
because they would complicate the formal analysis, while distracting the attention from the
main results discussed below. Whatever the source of uncertainty, as we point out in the
sequel, the key issue is how the correlations of the debt returns change with monetary uni-
fication. As we shall argue, the correlation of inflation rates will tend to increase among
countries that form a monetary union, thereby contributing to higher correlations of the debt
returns.
The primary objective of the central bank is to maintain price stability, that is, to stabilize
the inflation rate around zero. However, the central bank also cares about the public debt that
the government has to repay (possibly because of pressure from the fiscal authorities), and
therefore has an incentive to create surprise inflation, thereby driving down the ex-post real
debt return (6) on the nominal debt. Let us model this trade-off by assuming that the central





(πi,t+1)2 + λiBi,t (1 + ri,t+1)
]
, with λi > 0. (7)
One can interpret the parameter λi as a measure of the central bank’s dependence on
the government. The higher is λi , the more dependent is the central bank, because it
has a larger interest in softening the budgetary situation of the government, as measured
by Bi,t .
Loss function (7) is very similar to the central banks’ objective functions in Beetsma
and Uhlig (1999), where the central bank is also concerned with the governments’ finances.
This allows for a similar channel through which higher inflation reduces the real debt ser-
vicing cost of the government. Such a channel is also present in Chari and Kehoe (2004).
Higher (nominal) debt thus provides an incentive to relax monetary policy, thereby pro-
ducing more inflation. The mechanism is analogous to that in Barro and Gordon (1983a,
1983b) and the large literature that followed their work. There, the objective of the central
bank is formulated analogously to (7), but as a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and
stimulating employment. The monetary authority then has an incentive to exploit nominal
wage contracts (rather than the nominal debt contracts in this paper) in order to stimulate
the economy.
When the countries 1, . . . ,Nu form a monetary union, their central banks are replaced by
a common central bank for the whole union. This common central bank determines mut+1, the
8For an empirical analysis of default risk premia on Euro-area public debt, see Bernoth et al. (2003); see also
Arnold and Lemmen (2001).
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common nominal money growth rate in each country of the union. This, in turn, determines
πut+1, the common inflation rate throughout the union. The relation between mut+1 and πut+1 is
as in (5), where the stochastic shocks are now perfectly correlated among the countries that
participate in the monetary union, but are still independent otherwise. The other properties
of the shocks (in particular, their variances) are unaffected. Although this may come as a
rather strong assumption, it is a priori not clear how monetary unification affects the degree
to which a central bank is able to control the inflation rate. Hence, to avoid complicating
the analysis with too many changes at the same time, we assume that the variance of the
shock that links the money growth rate with the inflation rate is not affected by monetary
unification.
The assumption of perfectly correlated ε-shocks across the union members is made
purely for expositional convenience. Our results would be completely identical if we
dropped this assumption and focussed directly on the stochastic properties of the inflation
rates. As we will see below, all that matters are the correlations of inflation before and after
monetary unification, because this determines the correlations of the real debt returns.9 In
the absence of trade barriers, national inflation rates will be perfectly correlated in a union,
irrespective of the correlation in the ε-shocks of union members. Differences in these shocks
would simply be offset by differences in the growth rates of national holdings of the union-
wide currency. It is then the union-wide money growth rate that determines the common
inflation rate.
The loss function of the common central bank now depends on the union-wide inflation
rate πut+1 and on the average real public debt burden that the different governments in the













Bi,t (1 + ri,t+1)
]
, with λu > 0. (8)
We observe that countries with a higher debt level exert more influence on the common
central bank’s decisions.
Equation (5) implies that higher money growth, and therefore also higher expected infla-
tion, goes hand in hand with a higher variance of inflation. Furthermore, as inflation uncer-
tainty is the only source of uncertainty in the real debt returns, the variance of the inflation
rate πi,t+1 immediately yields the variance of ri,t+1:
Vart (ri,t+1) = Vart (πi,t+1) = m2i,t+1σ 2, (9)
which for i ∈ {1, . . . ,Nu} thus equals (mut+1)2σ 2 in the case of monetary unification. Given
that inflation is perfectly correlated across countries if they both participate in the monetary
9Note that nominal bond yields in the various member countries of EMU (except for Greece) have become
virtually identical since 1998 (see European Commission 2002, p. 157). So the only remaining source of
cross-country differences in real bond returns are cross-country differences in inflation rates.
10While the European Central Bank (ECB) is supposed to be completely independent from governments ac-
cording to the Maastricht Treaty, in reality, there are many ways in which politicians can exert some influence
on the ECB’s policies. One possibility is through the appointment of the national Euro-area central bank
presidents or the members of the ECB’s Executive Board. These two groups together form the Governing
Council which decides on the monetary policy stance in the Euro-area. Also, policymakers have repeatedly
made public calls on the ECB to relax its policy stance. Overall, the assumption that λu > 0 seems to be a
realistic one in the case of the ECB.
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union but independent across countries otherwise, we have the following expressions for the
covariances between the real debt returns:





if i and j both participate in a monetary union, (10)
Covt (ri,t+1, rj,t+1) = Covt (πi,t+1,πj,t+1) = 0, otherwise.
2.1.4 Equilibrium conditions
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that
NY + (1 + r∗)It−1 = C1,t + It + C2,t + Gt (11)
where C1,t ≡ ∑Ni=1 Ci1,t is the aggregate consumption of all young agents in the world,
C2,t ≡ ∑Ni=1 Ci2,t is the aggregate consumption of all old agents, Gt ≡
∑N
i=1 Gi,t is ag-




j,t ) is the
aggregate investment in the risk-free rate technology. Hence, (11) says that aggregate pro-
duction plus the gross return on the previous period’s risk-free investment equals aggregate
expenditure.









i,t , for all i. (12)
2.2 Solution of the model
The timing within an arbitrary period t is as follows. First, each government selects its
public debt level. Simultaneously, conditional expectations Et [·] are formed and private
sector agents take their investment decisions. In selecting its public debt, each govern-
ment takes into account the private sector’s demand schedule for its public debt, but
takes as given the other governments’ debt choices, as well as monetary policy. Next,
the central bank of country i chooses mi,t+1, if i does not participate in a monetary
union, and the union central bank—if a union is formed—selects the common money
growth rate mut+1. Finally, the shocks εi,t+1 materialize. This determines the realized in-
flation rate and the realized rate of return on the various countries’ public debt. Hence,
εi,t+1 is not included in the information set on which the conditional expectation Et [·] is
based.
We first derive the representative agents’ demand for public debt. Then, we derive the
solutions to the problems faced by the governments and the central banks.
The first-order conditions of the representative young agent in country i with respect to
her decisions to hold country j ’s public debt and to invest in the risk-free technology, are:
1 − γCi1,t =
1






, for all j, (13)
Ci1,t = Ci,e2,t+1. (14)
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Substitute the budget constraint (1) into (13) and work out the argument of the expectations
operator. One then finds:


















, for all j.
Aggregating across the representative agents of the different countries, taking into account
the equilibrium conditions (12) and using the assumption that r∗ = ρ, we obtain the fol-
lowing “mean-variance”-expression for the demand for country i’s debt as a function of its
expected real interest rate:








with μt = γ
N(1 − γ C¯1,t )
. (15)
Here, C¯1,t = C1,t /N is the average consumption of the representative agents of the young
generation across the different countries, so that 1 − γ C¯1,t is the average marginal utility of
consumption across agents.
Equation (15) shows that the expected return on country i’s public debt, rei,t+1, contains a
risk premium above the risk-free rate r∗. The higher the amount of outstanding public debt
Bi,t , and the higher the variance of its rate of return and the covariances of its rate of return
with those on other countries’ public debt, the higher the risk premium.
The problem of government i amounts to the minimization of its loss function (4), subject
to its budget constraint (3) and expression (15), taking the public debt of the other countries
and monetary policy (and, thus, the (co)variances of the returns) as given. This yields the
following expression for the supply of country i’s debt as a function of its expected real
interest rate:
rei,t+1 = βi − μtBi,tVart (ri,t+1). (16)
The intuition for this expression is as follows. Government i issues debt until the real interest
rate that it expects to pay on its public debt equals its myopia βi minus a term that takes into
account that a marginal increase of its indebtedness drives up the interest rate and, therefore,
makes all of its outstanding debt more expensive. In the following, we shall confine the
analysis to the case of βi > rei,t+1 (such that Bi,t > 0) for all countries i.
We shall now consider the central banks’ optimization problem. To this end, we shall
distinguish the situation before and after monetary unification.
2.2.1 Solution without a monetary union
In the absence of a monetary union each country has its own central bank. The problem of
the central bank of country i is then to choose the money growth rate mi,t+1 such that it
minimizes its loss function (7), subject to (5) and taking the country’s public debt level Bi,t
and the expected values rei,t+1 and πei,t as given. This leads to
mi,t+1 = πei,t+1 =
λiBi,t
1 + σ 2 . (17)
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Hence, the money growth rate is increasing in the amount of debt and the degree of central
bank dependence, λi .




1 + σ 2
)2
σ 2 ≡ σ˜ 2i , (18)
Covt (ri,t+1, rj,t+1) = 0, for all j = i. (19)
Substitute these expressions into (15–16), equate the resulting right-hand sides and solve to
give














where the superscript “nu” refers to the case of “no union”. For future use, we derive the
















where bnui,t denotes the relative public debt level and B¯nut the average debt level. Finally, the






(βi + r∗). (23)
Equations (21–23) can be interpreted as follows. First recall the role of government i’s
myopia parameter i: the higher βi , the less weight government i attaches to its public debt
Bi,t in its loss function (4), and the more public debt it supplies for a given expected rate
of return according to the debt supply equation (16). But according to the debt demand
equation (15), the representative agents of the different countries are only willing to hold
more of country i’s public debt if they receive a higher risk premium as a compensation for
their greater exposure to shocks in country i’s inflation rate. As a result, a higher value of
βi increases not only the equilibrium value of country i’s public debt Bnui,t according to (21),
but also the equilibrium value of the expected real interest rate re,nui,t+1 according to (23).
Let us now consider the role of the dependence parameter λi of country i’s central bank.
The higher λi , the more the central bank worries about country i’s public debt according
to its loss function (7), and the more it is tempted—given inflation expectations—to create
surprise inflation in order to decrease the real rate of return on government i’s public debt
and relieve its debt burden. This, however, leads to a stronger inflation bias, and—in a long-
run rational expectations equilibrium—to faster money growth, as described by (17). But
as faster money growth goes hand in hand with a larger inflation variance according to (9),
the variance of the real interest rate on country i’s public debt, Vart (ri,t+1), increases as
well. As a result, the representative agents reduce their demand for country i’s public debt
according to the debt demand equation (15), while government i reduces its supply of public
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debt according to the debt supply equation (16). In a long run equilibrium, a higher value of
λi therefore decreases country i’s public debt Bnui,t , while it leaves the expected real rate of
return re,nui,t+1 unaffected, as is apparent from (21) and (23).11
Finally, note from (22) that country i’s share of public debt in the total public debt of
the different countries (bnui,t ) is higher the more myopic country i’s government is compared
with the other governments (i.e. the higher βi is compared to the values of β in the other
countries), and is lower the more country i’s central bank worries about public debt com-
pared with the other central banks (i.e. the higher λi is compared to the values of λ in the
other countries).
Before moving on, it is worthwhile to point out that the model tries to capture the in-
teraction between fiscal and monetary policy in the long run.12 More specifically, the as-
sumption that higher public debt leads to a more relaxed monetary policy, is an assumption
which holds in the long run, and for which there exists substantial evidence (for example,
see Catão and Terrones 2005, who confirm this relation for advanced moderate-inflation
economies, although it is stronger for high-inflation and/or less-developed countries). Note
that the model presented here ignores another mechanism through which public debt may af-
fect monetary policy in reality. A central bank that is confronted with a myopic government
that runs up a large public debt, may want to increase the short-run interest rate and thereby
tighten monetary policy in order to discipline the government.13 However, one would expect
this mechanism to be only present in the short run. As time goes on, interest differentials
with the rest of the world trigger capital flows and exchange rate adjustments. Eventually,
the economy must move back to a long run equilibrium where the risk-free real interest rate
is at the same level as abroad, and where the real rate of return on public debt only differs
from the returns abroad to the extent that the risk characteristics of the underlying assets are
different—as described in this paper.
2.2.2 Solution with a monetary union
Let us now consider the case where the countries 1, . . . ,Nu form a monetary union. The
problem of the common central bank is to choose the union-wide money growth rate mut+1
such that its loss function (8) is minimized subject to (5), taking as given all debt levels as
well as the expected values rei,t+1 and π
e,u
t+1. This leads to:
mi,t+1 = mut+1 = πei,t+1 = πe,ut+1 =
λuB¯ut
1 + σ 2 ,
for all countries i that participate in the union,
11The fact that a higher inflation variance, and therefore also a higher value of Vart (ri,t+1), does not affect
the expected real rate of return re,nu
i,t+1, is the result of the quadratic specification of the utility function and
the linear-quadratic specifications of the loss functions of the central bank and the government. However,
one expects the main intuition to survive with other specifications as well: generally, for a given expected
rate of return, a higher return variance will reduce both the demand and the supply of debt. These effects
work in opposite directions, so that the change in the equilibrium rate of return may be relatively small. This
underlines the importance of explicitly modelling not only the demand for debt, but also its supply.
12The importance of looking at the long-term consequences of fiscal deficits for monetary policy was em-
phasized long ago by Sargent and Wallace (1981).
13Actually, Berger and Schneider (2000) report evidence that the German Bundesbank, which is often seen as
a role model for central bank independence, had a tendency to yield to conflicts with the government (while
taking an anti-inflationary stance otherwise). They define a conflict as a situation when monetary and fiscal
policy are not compatible, because one is expansionary and the other is contractionary.
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i,t is the average debt level in the union’s member countries. The




1 + σ 2
)2
σ 2 ≡ σˆ 2, for all countries i that participate in the union, (24)
Covt (ri,t+1, rj,t+1) =
{
σˆ 2, if countries i and j both participate in the union,
0, otherwise.
(25)
Hence, we observe that countries with relatively high debt have a relatively large effect on
money growth and the variance of the (common) ex-post real interest rate. If we substitute
the above expressions into (15) and (16), we obtain, respectively,
rei,t+1 = ret+1 = r∗ + Nuμut B¯ut σˆ 2, (26)
rei,t+1 = βi − μut Buit σˆ 2 (27)
where the superscript “u” in μut and Buit refers to the case of a monetary union. Take the
union average of (27):
ret+1 = β¯u − μut B¯ut σˆ 2 (28)
where β¯u = 1
Nu
∑Nu
i=1 βi is the average value of βi across the union members. Combin-
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(1 + Nu)μut (λu)2
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= 1 + (1 + Nu)βi − β¯
u
β¯u − r∗ , (30)
which we obtain by combining (26–28). Finally, the equilibrium expected real debt return,





1 + Nu β¯
u + 1
1 + Nu r
∗. (31)
The expected debt returns and the public debt levels of the countries not in the union are still
given by (23) and (21), respectively, but with μnut replaced by μut .
3 The effect of a monetary union on debt returns and public debt
In this section we analyze how monetary unification affects the relative debt levels and the
returns on the public debt of the union’s members.
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3.1 The effect on expected real returns
Let us first consider the expected real debt returns. In the derivation of (23) and (31) the
variance of the real return (σ˜ 2, respectively σˆ 2) drops out and, thus, in equilibrium does
not affect the expected real return. The reason for this is as follows. According to (15),
the higher the variance Vart (ri,t+1), the less public debt investors are willing to hold in
their portfolio for a given expected rate of return. However, according to (16), the higher
Vart (ri,t+1), the less public debt the government will want to supply for a given expected
rate of return. As a result, any change in the demand for debt due to a change in Vart (ri,t+1)
will be accompanied by a change in the supply of debt of equal magnitude. This implies that
in equilibrium, a change in Vart (ri,t+1) only affects the level of the public debt, but not its
expected rate of return. This leads us to Proposition 1, which follows immediately from the
preceding discussion.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, uncertainty about the inflation rate does not affect the ex-
pected real debt returns. Consequently, whether inflation becomes more or less predictable
when countries form a monetary union, does not matter for the expected real debt returns.
However, when countries form a monetary union, the returns on their public debt become
perfectly correlated with each other. As a result, holding public debt of these countries in-
creases the risk of the investors’ overall portfolio, even when the variance of the debt returns
does not change. Individuals will therefore demand a higher risk premium, which drives up
the average expected rate of return. This yields Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (a) The average expected real return on the public debt of the potential union
members increases as a result of monetary unification. (b) Given that countries form a mon-
etary union, the average expected real return on their public debt is increasing in the union
size.
Proof (a) The average expected real rate of return on the public debt of countries 1, . . . ,Nu












Equation (31) immediately yields the (average) expected real rate of return re,ut+1 when the
countries do form a monetary union. As we assume throughout the analysis that Bi,t > 0
for all countries i, it follows from (29) that β¯u > r∗. This implies that Nu1+Nu β¯u + 11+Nu r∗ >
1
2 (β¯





(b) Immediate from (31) and the fact that β¯u > r∗. 
While the average expected real return increases as a result of monetary unification, some
countries may actually experience a fall in the expected real return on their debt, as a result of
the fact that the expected returns on the participants’ debt have converged to the same level.
This will be the case for countries with a government that is sufficiently myopic relative to
the other governments. All other governments will face an increase in the expected cost of
issuing public debt.
To see the intuition for part (b) of Proposition 2, observe that an increase in the number of
union members means that a larger amount of perfectly substitutable debt is issued. Hence,
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Fig. 1
for investors to be willing to buy this debt, the required expected return must be higher
for any given level of B¯ut . This is captured by the term Nu in (26). In addition, the return
variance, σˆ 2, rises because of the increase in B¯ut . This further raises the required expected
return for any given level of B¯ut . However, in equilibrium, this effect is offset by the fall in
the supply of debt resulting from the higher return variance—see (28). Figure 1 depicts (26)
and (28) as functions of B¯ut . An increase in Nu means that (26) becomes steeper and, hence,
the equilibrium expected return rises.
3.2 The effect on public debt
Now, we further analyze the outcomes for public debt. Equation (21) shows that Bnui,t depends
on μnut . Similarly, Bui,t depends on μut . In turn, the values of μnut and μut are functions of
the consumption of young agents without and with a monetary union, respectively, while
consumption itself is determined jointly with the public debt levels. Unfortunately, there
does not seem to exist a closed-form solution for consumption and the public debt levels.
This prevents us from formally comparing the public debt levels before and after monetary
unification.
However, we can circumvent this problem by looking at relative debt levels. These
also seem politically more relevant, as it is difficult for a high-debt government to blame
other governments for their indebtedness. Relative debt levels can become a much bigger
source of tension in a monetary union, because they may lead to differences in the po-
tential externalities that countries exert on each other. Here, the relevant externality is the
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effect of a country’s debt on another country’s expected real debt return. Equation (15)
shows that the direct effect of country j ’s debt on country i’s required real debt return is
μtBj,tCovt (ri,t+1, rj,t+1). While in the absence of monetary unification, this direct effect is
zero because Covt (ri,t+1, rj,t+1) = 0, the effect is positive when the two countries participate
in a union. The relative size of this effect that the two countries exert on each other is the
inverse of the ratio of their debt levels, Bj,t /Bi,t . The increased importance of the externality
just described may help to explain why European countries have become more concerned
about each other’s fiscal discipline since EMU became a realistic prospect.
We are now ready to present Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (a) If country i’s government (i = 1, . . . ,Nu) before monetary unification
is sufficiently myopic compared to the governments of the other prospective members, then
i’s relative public debt level will increase after unification. (b) For countries that already
form a union, the relative public debt level is increasing (decreasing) in the union size Nu if
βi > β¯
u (βi < β¯u).
Proof (a) From (22, 30) it follows that the relative public debt level of country i increases
after monetary unification if and only if
1 + (1 + Nu)βi − β¯
u

























As we assume throughout the analysis that Bi,t > 0 for all countries i, (30) implies that
the left-hand side of the inequality above is always positive. If βi goes to ∞ (holding βj
(j = i) fixed), then the left-hand side of this inequality converges to 1 + (1 + Nu)(Nu − 1),
while the right-hand side converges to Nu. Hence, the inequality will hold if government i
is sufficiently myopic relative to the other governments.
(b) Immediate from (30). 
We can explain part (a) of Proposition 3 as follows. A country with a relatively myopic
government will tend to have a relatively high public debt level for a given variance of
real debt returns—see (21). Suppose first that this country has its own central bank. The
relatively high public debt level will induce the central bank to try to create surprise inflation,
which leads to a high money growth rate in equilibrium—see (17). This, in turn, causes
high inflation uncertainty, and therefore also a high variance of the real debt returns. This
adverse implication of issuing a relatively large amount of debt induces the government
to limit its public debt somewhat. Suppose now that the country joins a monetary union,
so that its central bank is replaced by a union-wide central bank. This union-wide central
bank takes into account the public debt levels of all its member countries when deciding
to what extent it will try to create inflation. It will, therefore, be less tempted to try to
create high inflation and maintain a high money growth rate in response to the relatively
high public debt level in an individual member country. However, if the money growth rate
decreases in a country with a relatively high public debt level when it joins a monetary
union, the inflation uncertainty, and therefore also the variance of real debt returns, will
decrease as well. As a result, the mitigating feedback-effect on the public debt decision
of the government will weaken, and the government will feel less restrained to issue debt.
So, the indebtedness of a country with a relatively myopic government will increase after
monetary unification compared to the average indebtedness in the union’s member countries.
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Vice versa for a country with a government characterized by a relatively low degree of
myopia.
Part (b) of Proposition 3 can be understood as follows. First, recall that the expected
real debt return is increasing in the number of member countries of the monetary union
(see Proposition 2(b)). Now, note from (27) that each member country will reduce its public
debt by the same amount when the expected real debt return rises. Hence, when the union
expands, countries with a relatively forward-looking government that already start with a
relatively low debt level will decrease their public debt in absolute terms as much as coun-
tries with a relatively myopic government that start with a relatively high public debt level.
As a result, when union expands, countries with a relatively myopic government will face
an increase of their relative indebtedness compared with the average indebtedness in the
union.
Now, we turn to the final result of this subsection, and establish:
Proposition 4 If the central bank of a country before monetary unification is sufficiently
dependent relative to the central banks of the other prospective members, then the relative
public debt level of the country increases after monetary unification (i.e., bui,t > bnui,t ).
Proof Observe that the right-hand side of (32) converges to 0 when λi goes to infinity (hold-
ing λj (j = i) fixed). Hence, (32) holds if the central bank of country i is sufficiently de-
pendent relative to the other central banks. 
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. For a given level of public debt, a coun-
try with a relatively dependent central bank (compared to the other prospective members of
the monetary union) will have a relatively strong desire to create surprise inflation, and there-
fore in equilibrium a relatively high money growth rate. As explained above, the prospect of
a high money growth rate has a mitigating effect on the amount of debt issued by the govern-
ment. Hence, governments of countries with a relatively dependent central bank will have a
relatively strong incentive to limit their public debt levels. However, in a monetary union, all
governments face the same money growth rate. As a result, the relative public debt of coun-
tries that experience a relatively high money growth rate under monetary independence, will
increase once they join the union.
3.3 Extension
Note that λu, the common central bank’s dependence parameter, can attain any positive
value. As a result, λu may or may not be related to the values of λi in the loss functions of
the individual central banks before the monetary union was formed. Our analysis therefore
continues to hold even when we assume that countries that had relatively dependent central
banks before the monetary unification, manage to lobby successfully for a relatively depen-
dent common central bank in the monetary union. Similarly, λu may or may not be related
to the values of βi in the loss functions of the union countries’ governments. Hence, the out-
comes under a monetary union also remain valid if we assume that countries with relatively
myopic governments manage to lobby successfully for a relatively dependent common cen-
tral bank.
An interesting case is when λu is equal to a weighted average of the λi -values of the
individual central banks before the monetary union, where the weights are given by the
relative debt positions of the different governments (which in turn reflect relative degrees of
myopia of the governments). This captures in a straightforward way the idea that countries
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with relatively large public debt levels lobby harder to influence monetary policy and can





i,t , where bui,t is country i’s relative public debt level
as defined before. In this case the common central bank’s loss function boils down to the
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,
because ri,t+1 is equal across the union members.
An empirically plausible case occurs when government myopia combines with a rela-
tively high degree of central bank dependence. That is, a high value of βi causes both λi and
Bi,t to be high. Equations (24, 27) show that then, for given rei,t+1, a higher value of βi has
a direct positive effect on Bui,t , but also a negative indirect effect on Bui,t , because the higher
value of λi raises σˆ 2 which, in turn, produces a negative effect on Bui,t for given rei,t+1. In
other words, the larger effect of an increase in its debt on the common central bank’s policy
implies that government i moderates its fiscal profligacy.
3.4 Euro-area data
In principle, Propositions 1–4 provide empirical predictions that could be directly tested us-
ing data on inflation, real interest rates, (relative) debt levels and indices for central bank
independence. However, there are at least two major obstacles to such tests. While our the-
ory makes predictions about long-run relationships, the Euro has existed only for a limited
number of years, which is less than a single business cycle for many countries. The move-
ments in (relative) public debt, real interest rate and inflation observed so far are, therefore,
dominated by short-run cyclical fluctuations in GDP. Using data from the OECD Economic
Outlook, we have calculated the GDP-weighted average ex-post long-run real interest for
the Euro-area (excluding Luxembourg and Greece), which falls from 3.40% in 1998 (the
year before the start of EMU) to 1.32% in 2005. The corresponding figures for the rest of
the OECD are 3.44% in 1998 and 1.49% in 2005. Hence, the real interest rate has experi-
enced a larger fall in the Euro area than in the rest of the OECD, which contrasts with what
Proposition 2(a) predicts. However, it is well known that the Euro area has been lagging
behind the world economy since the end of the nineties and that this has in particular been
the case for its largest economies. While starting from mid-2003 the U.S. Fed has raised its
target for the federal funds rate a large number of times, the ECB has been much slower
raising its key main refinancing rate. With sticky price levels in the short run, the relative
fall in the European real interest rate is not surprising.
The second major obstacle to testing our propositions is that our theory focuses on one
specific aspect of monetary unification. In the case of EMU, however, many other aspects
should be taken into account in order to interpret the data correctly. Especially the con-
straints on the member countries’ fiscal policies imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact
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may be relevant. Furthermore, several other factors may affect the consequences of mone-
tary unification for the risk characteristics of the public debt. For example, monetary uni-
fication may also affect liquidity premia (see Codogno et al. 2003) and reduce market seg-
mentation, effects that are not modeled here, but that are likely to be of relevance in prac-
tice.
We have also computed relative debt levels between 1998 and 2005 as bui,t =
Bi,t /
∑Nu
j Bj,t , where Bi,t is country i’s public debt in period t and
∑Nu
j Bj,t is the total
public debt in period t in the entire Euro area (expressed in a common currency).14 The
source of the data is again the OECD Economic Outlook. However, we see no clear pat-
tern in the changes in relative debt. Of the countries that entered the Euro-area with more
than 100% of GDP debt, Greece experienced an increase in relative debt, while Belgium
and Italy saw their relative debt decline. The same obstacles for testing our theory on real
interest rates remain present also for tests conducted on public debt.
4 A simple transfer scheme to avoid the interest rate hike
In the previous section, we showed that the average expected real debt return increases in our
model when countries form a monetary union. In fact, this is due to a pecuniary externality
that the governments of the individual countries do not internalize when they decide how
much debt to supply. As (15) shows, the externality arises, because monetary unification
raises the correlation of the returns on the public debt issued by the member countries. The
question thus arises whether it is somehow possible to induce governments to internalize
the interest rate externalities from the changes in public debt policies caused by monetary
unification.
It turns out that the upward pressure on the expected real debt return can be offset with
a simple transfer scheme that transfers resources to or from other countries when a coun-
try’s public debt deviates from the average public debt level of the union members. Such
a transfer scheme has some resemblance to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which is
also intended to discipline profligate governments. However, the SGP imposes sanctions for
deficit/GDP ratios that exceed the 3% level,15 while the transfer scheme proposed here is ef-
fectively based on relative public debt levels.16 Hence, with the transfer scheme the budget
constraint of the government of country i becomes:
Bi,t = Gi,t + Bi,t−1(1 + ri,t ) + τ(Bi,t − B¯ut ) − Ti,t , i = 1, . . . ,Nu, (33)
where τ(Bi,t − B¯ut ) is the transfer, with τ a constant which will be chosen in such a way that
the average expected interest rate is restored to the pre-monetary union level. Observe that
14Note that the exchange rate fluctuations in 1998 have been minimal because the decision about the Euro
conversion rates was made well in advance of the actual moment they were fixed. Hence, the computed
relative debt levels in 1998 have hardly been affected by such fluctuations.
15For analyses of the SGP and closely related schemes, see e.g. Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Beetsma and
Bovenberg (2001), Debrun (2000), Dixit (2001) and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). More informal discussions of the
Pact and its consequences can be found in Artis and Winkler (1998), Brunila et al. (2001) and Uhlig (2002).
16It is probably fair to say that relative deficit levels play a major role in the operation of the SGP. The
reason is that the initiation of the so-called Excessive Deficit procedure and the ensuing sanctions are decided
upon by qualified majority vote in the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) of the EU.
Hence, fear of “retaliation” may prevent countries with high deficits to vote for imposing sanctions on other
countries.
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the transfer scheme is budgetary neutral at the union level, because the sum of the transfers
across all countries is zero.
The demand for country i’s debt as a function of its expected real interest rate (15) re-
mains unchanged. However, the supply of country i’s debt as a function of its expected real
interest rate is now found by minimizing the loss function (4), subject to (15, 33):





(1 + βi). (34)
By substituting (24, 25) into (15, 34) one can then solve for the expected real debt return in





1 + Nu β¯
u + 1






τ(1 + β¯u), (35)
which is, of course, constant across countries. The value of τ that restores the pre-unification
expected average real interest rate for the region follows upon equating (35) to the union
average of (23), 12 (β¯u + r∗). The solution is







Hence, the transfer scheme results in payments from member countries with a higher-
than-average public debt to member countries with a lower-than-average public debt. The
amount that a member country pays or receives is proportional to the difference between
its own debt level and the average debt level across the union members. Note also that the
proportionality factor is an increasing function of β¯u, the average degree of myopia of the
union governments.
Now, substitute (36) for τ , 12 (β¯u + r∗) for rei,t+1 and (24) for Vart (ri,t+1) into (34). Upon
rewriting the resulting expression, we obtain
Bui,t =


















The final term in the curly brackets of this expression arises from the presence of the transfer
scheme, which provides an incentive to government i to reduce its public debt. With the use










Holding μut constant, the average debt level falls compared to the situation without the trans-
fer scheme. This is not surprising, given that the transfer scheme makes it more costly for
governments to issue debt.















Now, compare (38) with (30). It is easy to check that the transfer scheme implies a rise (fall)
in the relative debt level iff βi > (<) β¯u. The fall in the average debt level induced by the
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transfer scheme “blows up” the relative debt levels, despite the fact that the scheme provides
a more myopic government with a stronger incentive to reduce its debt—see (37). Hence,
with the proposed scheme, the least disciplined governments issue an even larger share of
the union’s debt.
We can now summarize the results of this section in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 We have that (a) a linear transfer scheme which depends on the difference
between the individual and average union debt is able to restore the pre-unification average
expected debt return and (b) the dispersion in relative debt levels increases further with the
introduction of this transfer scheme.
5 Conclusion
While the effects of monetary unification on real interest rates and (relative) public debt ac-
cumulation have to a large extent been ignored in the literature, in the preceding analysis we
have demonstrated that this may be unjustified. The implications of unification for the real
interest rate become important when the returns on the public debt are imperfectly corre-
lated across countries. Monetary unification increases the substitutability of the public debt.
As a result, our model predicts a rise in expected debt-servicing costs. In addition, the share
of the union debt issued by relatively undisciplined governments increases. Similarly, the
share of the union debt issued by a country initially characterized by a relatively dependent
central bank rises. These effects of monetary unification on the spread of the relative debt
levels may be a source of political tension and provide some governments with an incentive
to put pressure on other governments to reduce their debt. This, in turn, may weaken the
political sustainability of a monetary union. We have also explored the introduction of a
transfer scheme that punishes increases of the national debt beyond the average debt level
in the union. Such a scheme can indeed reduce the average expected real debt return to the
pre-unification level. However, it further magnifies the spread in relative debt levels.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible we have assumed an exogenous degree of
government myopia. However, in reality, such myopia will generally be determined by the
political landscape and the way the electoral system works. For instance, governments that
need to be formed by party coalitions (as is relatively likely under a system of proportional
representation) tend to be characterized by internal ideological differences, and this ideolog-
ical fragmentation may result in government deficits—see Balassone and Giordano (1999)
for a theoretical formalization and some empirical evidence for a sample of European coun-
tries. Volkerink and de Haan (2001) do not find evidence for this hypothesis, but argue that
size fragmentation, which refers to the number of parties or spending ministers in govern-
ment, produces higher deficits—an empirical result confirmed by Ricciuti (2004). Huber et
al. (2003) stress the importance of power dispersion within coalition governments: coalition
governments with equally strong partners run significantly higher deficits than coalitions
with one dominating party. Furthermore, there exists a widespread belief that shorter ex-
pected tenure or a higher turnover rate of governments produces more myopic policies (an
example might be Italy), even though formal testing by Ricciuti (2004) does not find clear
evidence for this hypothesis.
A relevant extension of our set-up would therefore be to endogenize differences in gov-
ernment myopia by explicitly taking into account its sources. This would link differences in
relative debt and cross-border interest rate externalities to the political systems and electoral
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processes in the union members.17 We could then even go one step further, and investigate
whether it is in the interests of re-election-minded politicians to join a monetary union, given
the effects of union membership on public debt and domestic interest rates. Indeed, politi-
cians of large Euro-area member states have repeatedly expressed in public their concern
about the “too high” level of the interest rate. Also, some of the contributors (e.g., Bar-
rell and Minford) to the EMU study commissioned by the British Treasury (HM Treasury
2003) have pointed out the danger of increasing public debt in some Euro-area members
and concomitant higher real interest rates. However, such an analysis would be beyond the
scope of the present paper. Yet, we believe that our modeling strategy, where we take union
membership and the different governments’ degree of myopia as exogenously given, is an
appropriate first step in analyzing the issues raised in this paper.
In addition to some of the public choice extensions discussed in the previous paragraphs,
a number of other extensions might be worthwhile to pursue. A fully-fledged analysis of the
implications of monetary unification for debt-servicing costs should also take into account
how unification affects the liquidity of the public debt of individual countries. In particular,
due to the reduction of formal and informal barriers to cross-border financial transactions,
the size of the market for its public debt may expand when a country becomes part of a mon-
etary union. This makes it easier for investors to adjust their public debt holdings. Hence,
potential liquidity premia will shrink. Another extension allows for differences in inflation
rates also after monetary unification. Even though unification is likely to increase the cor-
relation of national inflation rates and thus of real debt returns, (short-run) differences in
national inflation rates can persist for several reasons, such as cross-country differences in
consumption bundles or the presence of non-tradables. While our results are unlikely to be
qualitatively affected, such complications will surely have quantitative implications for the
change in borrowing costs and relative debt levels after unification. A third extension is to
enrich the stochastic structure of the model by introducing (time-varying) default risk. Even
though default on public debt of EMU members seems a remote possibility at present, in
the longer run it may not be excluded, especially if governments respond to increasing costs
of population aging by issuing more debt. The crucial question is how monetary unification
affects the correlation of default risks and thus the risk premium in the required debt returns.
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